

GERGELY UJHELYI

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Employment

2007- Assistant Professor, Economics Department, University of Houston

Education

PhD in Economics, Harvard University, 2007
MA in Economics, Central European University, 2002
MSc in Economics, Budapest University of Economics, 2001
Rajk College for Advanced Studies, Budapest, 1997-2002

References

Professor Elhanan Helpman Economics Department, Harvard University Littauer 229 Cambridge, MA 02138 ehelpman@harvard.edu, T: 617-495-4690	Professor Alberto Alesina Economics Department, Harvard University Littauer 210 Cambridge, MA 02138 aalesina@harvard.edu, T: 617-495-8388
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Professor Edward Glaeser Economics Department, Harvard University Littauer 315A Cambridge, MA 02138 eglaeser@harvard.edu, T: 617-496-2150	Professor Chinhui Juhn Economics Department, University of Houston McElhinney Hall 204 Houston, TX 77204 cjuhn@uh.edu, T: 713-743-3823
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Research and Teaching fields

Public economics, Political economy, Applied theory, Environmental economics

Publications

- G. Ujhelyi (2009): "Campaign Finance Regulation with Competing Interest Groups," *Journal of Public Economics* 93(3-4), 373-391.
- P. Fredriksson, E. Neumayer, and G. Ujhelyi (2007): "Kyoto Protocol Cooperation: Does Government Corruption Facilitate Environmental Lobbying?" *Public Choice* 133(1-2), 231-51.

Working Papers

- "Political Screening: Theory and Evidence from the Argentine Public Sector" (2009) with Ernesto Calvo (JOB MARKET PAPER)
- "Regulating Misinformation" (2009) with Edward Glaeser, Revise and Resubmit at the *Journal of Public Economics*
- "What Do Corruption Indices Measure?" (2009) with Dilyan Donchev

“Political Institutions, Interest Groups, and the Ratification of International Environmental Agreements” (2006) with Per Fredriksson

Research in Progress

“Competition and Coordination in Collective Action”

“Social Learning with Subjective Communication and Self-selection” with Péter Kondor

“Endowment Game and Optimal Total Quantity in the Market for Tradable Permits,” updated version of *CEU Economics Working Paper 1/2002*

Publications in Hungarian

G. Ujhelyi (2002): “Endowment Game and Optimal Total Quantity in Artificial Markets,” *Sigma - Hungarian Journal of Mathematical Economics* 33(1-2), 69-99.

G. Ujhelyi (1999): “Welfare Effects of the Diffusion of a Pollution Reducing Innovation,” *Hungarian Economic Review*, December, 1059-1075.

Teaching Experience

Houston: *Political Economy* (grad.), *Microeconomic Theory* (grad.)

Harvard: Teaching assistant for *Development Economics* (undergrad.), *Game Theory* (undergrad.), *Microeconomic Theory* (grad. and undergrad.), 2004-05

Rajk College for Advanced Studies, Budapest: *Microeconomic Theory* (undergrad.), 2001-02

Invited Seminars and Conferences

Rice University (scheduled), Harvard-MIT, University of Toulouse, Center for European Economic Research (ZEW), University of Houston

Southern Economic Association meeting 2009 (scheduled), American Political Science Association congress 2008, World Congress on National Accounts and Economic Performance Measures for Nations, Public Choice Society meeting 2008, Yale School of Management: Whitebox Conference on Behavioral Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists conference 2004, European Economic Association congress 2003, 25th Hungarian Operations Research Conference (Won “Best Applied Paper by a Young Researcher” award).

Honors and Fellowships

Provost’s Travel Grant, University of Houston, 2009

Harvard Graduate Society Dissertation Completion Fellowship, 2006

Graduate Student Fellowship, Harvard University, 2002-03

Archimedes Prize of the European Commission for original undergraduate research in “Mathematical Modeling for the Social Sciences,” 2001

Kardos Award of the Rajk College for community work and academic achievements, 2001

Fellowship of the Hungarian Republic, 2000

Professional Activities

Referee for *American Economic Review*, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Journal of Public Economics*, *Southern Economic Journal*, *World Development*, *Policy Studies Journal*, *Political Studies*

PreDoctoral Fellow, Environmental Economics Program at Harvard University, 2002-2007

“P. Milgrom and J. Roberts: *Economics, Organization and Management*,” Hungarian translation (with Andrea Szabó), 2004

“D. Carlton and J. Perloff: *Modern Industrial Organization*,” Hungarian translation, 2002

Personal Information

Born: October 20, 1977, Budapest, Hungary.

Married. Hungarian citizen.

Languages

Native Hungarian, fluent in English, French and Spanish, basic Czech

Other interests

Boundary Waters Canoe Area, Rush, Le Livre des Questions

Job market paper abstract

“Political Screening: Theory and Evidence from the Argentine Public Sector” with Ernesto Calvo

Incumbent politicians wishing to extract political services from public-sector employees face an adverse selection problem. Partisan employees are willing to provide services for lower compensation, but political preferences are unobservable. We study a simple solution to this problem through the use of political screening contracts. Because vote shares provide information on the population share of partisans, the model predicts an association between an employee's salary and the incumbent politician's vote share at the time of hiring. We test for this effect using individual data from a large national income survey from Argentina, a country with widespread political patronage. Consistent with the model, we find a robust U-shaped relationship between public sector wages and the provincial governor's vote share at the time of hiring. Employees hired after an election won with approximately 50% of the votes earn significantly less than others. We use structural estimates of our model to quantify political patronage. Our results indicate that partisan employees earn an economically significant premium of 18-19%.