


*The SOCIETY for
PHILOSOPHY and
PSYCHOLOGY*

32nd Annual Meeting



June 1-4, 2006

SPP: 32nd Annual meeting (June 1- 4, 2006)

Program Overview

Thursday, June 1st

9:30 am - 6:30 pm	Registration (Atrium), Book display (Library)
9:30 am - 10:30 am	Coffee (Atrium)
10:45 am - 11:45 am	<u>Invited Talk #1</u> (Auditorium): Pascal Boyer & Pierre Lienard
11:45 am - 1:00 pm	Lunch break
1:00 pm - 4:00 pm	<u>Session A</u> (Auditorium): <i>Empirical Approaches to Philosophy</i> <u>Session B</u> (Room 218): <i>Consciousness and Phenomenology</i>
4:00 pm - 4:15 pm	Coffee (Atrium)
4:15 pm - 6:45 pm	<u>Invited Symposium #1</u> (Auditorium): <i>The James S. McDonnell Foundation Causal Learning Collaborative Symposium</i>
6:45 pm - 8:15 pm	<u>Poster Session & Reception</u> (Atrium)

Friday, June 2nd

8:30 am - 6:30 pm	Registration & Poster display (Atrium), Book display (Library)
8:30 am - 9:00 am	Coffee (Atrium)
9:00 am - 11:45 am	<u>Invited Symposium #2</u> (Auditorium): <i>Other Minds</i>
11:45 am - 1:00 pm	Lunch Break: Executive Committee Lunch (Whittemore House)
1:00 pm - 4:00 pm	<u>Session C</u> (Auditorium): <i>Morality and Value</i> (Liane Young * William James Prize Winner *) <u>Session D</u> (Room 218): <i>Mental State Attribution</i>
4:00 pm - 4:15 pm	Coffee (Atrium)
4:15 pm - 5:15 pm	<u>Invited Talk #2</u> (Auditorium): Lila Gleitman
5:15 pm - 6:15 pm	<u>Invited Talk #3</u> (Auditorium): Jesse Prinz
6:15 pm - 8:00 pm	<u>Poster Display & Reception</u> (Atrium)

Saturday, June 3rd

8:30 am - 6:30 pm	Registration & Book display (Library), Poster display (Atrium)
8:30 am - 9:00 am	Coffee (Atrium)
9:00 am - 12:00 pm	<u>Session E</u> (Auditorium): <i>Fiction and Imagination</i> <u>Session F</u> (Room 218): <i>Cognitive Architecture</i>
12:00 pm - 1:15 pm	Lunch break
1:15 pm - 4:15 pm	<u>Invited Symposium #3</u> (Auditorium): <i>The Cognitive Science of Religion</i>
4:15 pm - 4:30 pm	Coffee (Atrium)
4:30 pm - 5:30 pm	<u>Invited Talk #4</u> (Auditorium): Jenefer Robinson
5:30 pm - 6:30 pm	<u>Stanton Prize Address</u> (Auditorium): Fei Xu
6:30 pm - 7:30 pm	Reception (Holmes Lounge)
7:00 pm - 10:00 pm	<u>Banquet & Presidential Address</u> (Holmes Lounge): Paul Bloom

Sunday, June 4th

8:30 am - 9:00 am	Coffee (Atrium)
9:00 am - 11:30 am	<u>Invited Symposium #4</u> (Auditorium): <i>Social Cognition</i>
11:30 am - 1:30 pm	Business Meeting & Lunch (Holmes Lounge)

Thursday, June 1st

9:30 am - 6:30 pm

Registration

Atrium

9:30 am - 6:30 pm

Book Display

Library

9:30 am - 10:30 am

Coffee

Atrium

10:45 am - 11:45 am

Invited Talk #1:

Auditorium

Pascal Boyer (Dept. of Psychology, Washington University) & **Pierre Leinard** (Cognition & Culture, Queen's University, Belfast)

Why Do Religious Believers and Obsessive Patients Perform Rituals?

Chair: James Wertsch (Dept. of Psychology, Washington University)

11:45 am - 1:00 pm

Lunch Break

1:00 pm - 4:00 pm

Contributed Session A: Empirical Approaches to Philosophy

Auditorium

Chair: Daniel Weiskopf (Dept. of Philosophy, University of South Florida)

The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions

Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander, & Jonathan Weinberg (Dept. of Philosophy, Indiana Univ.)

Commentator: Phillip Robbins (Dept. of Philosophy & PNP, Washington University)

Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis

Justin Fisher (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Arizona)

Commentator: Joseph Cruz (Dept. of Philosophy, Williams College)

Honor and Responsibility: Two Ways To Motivate Retribution

Tamler Sommers (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Morris)

Commentator: Don Loeb (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Vermont)

1:00 pm - 4:00 pm

Contributed Session B: *Consciousness and Phenomenology*

Room 218

Chair: Chris Mole (Dept. of Philosophy & PNP, Washington University)

Do Things Look Flat?

Eric Schwitzgebel (Dept. of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside)

Commentator: Anthony Jack (Dept. of Neurology, Washington University)

Now or Never: How Consciousness Represents Time

Paula Droege (Dept. of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University)

Commentator: Brian Keeley (Dept. of Philosophy, Pitzer College)

Who Says You Can't Do a Molecular Biology of Consciousness?

John Bickle (Dept. of Philosophy and Graduate Neuroscience Program, Univ. of Cincinnati)

Commentator: Carl Gillett (Dept. of Philosophy, Illinois Wesleyan University)

4:00 pm - 4:15 pm

Coffee

Atrium

4:15 pm - 6:45 pm

Invited Symposium #1: *The James S. McDonnell Foundation Causal Learning Collaborative Symposium*

Auditorium

Chair: Shaun Nichols (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Utah)

Babies and Bayes Nets: Causal Inference in Young Children

Alison Gopnik (Dept. of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley)

Some Issues in the Empirical Psychology of Causal Judgment

James Woodward (Dept. of Philosophy, Cal Tech)

Causal Learning and Learning to Be Causal: A Bayesian Account

Noah Goodman (Dept. of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT)

6:45 pm - 8:15 pm

Poster Session & Reception

Atrium

Hosted by the Washington University Department of Philosophy

Friday, June 2nd

9:30 am - 6:30 pm

Registration

Atrium

9:30 am - 6:30 pm

Book Display

Library

8:30 am - 6:30 pm

Poster Display

Atrium

8:30 am - 9:00 am

Coffee

Atrium

9:00 am - 11:45 am

Invited Symposium #2: *Other Minds*

Auditorium

Chair: Anne Jacobson (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Houston)

Deduction and Categorization in Nonhuman Animals

Colin Allen & Ronaldo Vigo (Depts. of History & Philosophy of Science & Cognitive Science, Indiana University)

What Primates Understand about Their Social Partners' Rewards

Sarah Brosnan (Dept. of Anthropology, Emory University)

The Evolution of Mind Reading: Insights from Non-human Primates

Laurie Santos (Dept. of Psychology, Yale University)

11:45 am - 1:00 pm

Lunch Break

Executive Committee Lunch (Whittemore House)

1:00 pm - 4:00 pm

Contributed Session C: *Morality and Value*

Auditorium

Chair: Steven Horst (Dept. of Philosophy, Wesleyan College)

The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment

Fiery Cushman (Dept. of Psychology, Harvard University)

Commentator: Ron Mallon (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Utah)

The Concept of Valuing: Experimental Studies

Joshua Knobe (Dept. of Philosophy, UNC) & Erica Roedder (Dept. of Philosophy, NYU)

Commentator: Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State University)

Moral Judgment is More Consequentialist in Individuals with Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage

Liane Young (Dept. of Psychology, Harvard University)

**** William James Prize Winner ***

Commentator: Heidi Maibom (Dept. of Philosophy, Carleton University)

1:00 pm - 4:00 pm**Contributed Session D: Mental State Attribution**

Room 218

Chair: Christopher Hom (Dept. of Philosophy, Washington University)

Psychological Foundations of the Argument From Design

George Newman (Dept. of Psychology, Yale University)

Commentator: Tania Lombrozo (Dept. of Psychology, Harvard University)

Neo-Reductionist Views of Know-How

Charles Wallis (Dept. of Philosophy, California State University, Long Beach)

Commentator: José Luis Bermúdez (Dept. of Philosophy & PNP, Washington University)

Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist

Rob Wilson (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Alberta)

Commentator: Robert Rupert (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Colorado)

4:00 pm - 4:15 pm**Coffee**

Atrium

4:15 pm - 5:15 pm**Invited Talk #2:**

Auditorium

Lila Gleitman (Dept. of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania)*Language Learning Without Conceptual Development*

Chair: Brian Scholl (Dept. of Psychology, Yale University)

5:15 pm - 6:15 pm**Invited Talk #3:**

Auditorium

Jesse Prinz (Dept. of Philosophy, University of North Carolina)*Hume's Brain: Does Cognitive Science Confirm Humean Moral Psychology?*

Chair: Mark Rollins (Philosophy and PNP, Washington University)

6:15 pm - 8:00 pm**Poster Display & Reception**

Atrium

Hosted by the Washington University Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program

Saturday, June 3rd

9:30 am - 6:30 pm

Registration

Atrium

9:30 am - 6:30 pm

Book Display

Library

8:30 am - 6:30 pm

Poster Display

Atrium

8:30 am - 9:30 am

Coffee

Atrium

9:00 am - 12:00 pm

Contributed Session E: Fiction and Imagination

Auditorium

Chair: Robert Gordon (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis)

The Cognitive Architecture of Imaginative Resistance

Jonathan Weinberg (Dept. of Philosophy, Indiana University) & Aaron Meskin (Dept. of Philosophy, Leeds University)

Commentator: Jonathan Ichikawa (Dept. of Philosophy, Rutgers University)

The Creation of Fictional Worlds

Deena Skolnick, Josh Goodstein & Paul Bloom (Dept. of Psychology, Yale University)

Commentator: James Harold (Dept. of Philosophy, Mount Holyoak)

Learning Without Looking: Incubated Cognition And Creativity

Dustin Stokes (Dept. of Cognitive Science, University of Sussex)

Commentator: Kelby Mason (Dept. of Philosophy, Rutgers University)

9:00 am - 12:00 pm

Contributed Session F: Cognitive Architecture

Room 218

Chair: Gualtiero Piccinini (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Saint Louis)

Evidence for Massive Redeployment of Brain Areas in Cognitive Functions

Michael Anderson (Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland)

Commentator: Peter Mandik (Dept. of Philosophy, William Paterson University)

Massive Modularity and Brain Evolution

Edouard Machery (Dept. of History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh)

Commentator: Carl Craver (Dept. of Philosophy & PNP, Washington University)

Poverty of the Stimulus? A Rational Approach

Amy Perfors (Dept. of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT)

Commentator: Fei Xu (Dept. of Psychology, University of British Columbia)

12:00 pm - 1:15 pm

Lunch Break

1:15 pm - 4:15 pm

Invited Symposium #3: *The Cognitive Science of Religion*

Auditorium

Chair: Jesper Sorensen (Dept. of Comparative Religion, University of Southern Denmark)

Has Belief Been HADD? Agency Detection and Religious Belief

Justin Barrett (Cognition & Culture Centre, Oxford University)

Children's Belief in Invisible Witnesses

Jesse Bering (Cognition & Culture, Queen's University, Belfast)

Intuitive Theism?: The Teleo-functional Bias

Deborah Keleman (Dept. of Psychology, Boston University)

The Cognitive Foundations of Religious Ritual Patterns

Robert McCauley (Dept. of Philosophy, Emory University)

4:15 pm - 4:30 pm

Coffee

Atrium

4:30 pm - 5:30 pm

Invited Talk #4: Jenefer Robinson (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati)

Auditorium

What's Basic about Basic Emotions?

Chair: Stephanie Ross (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis)

5:30 pm - 6:30 pm

Stanton Prize Address: Fei Xu (Dept. of Psychology, University of British Columbia)

Auditorium

Infants' Metaphysics

Chair: Paul Bloom (Dept. of Psychology, Yale University)

6:30 pm - 7:00 pm

Reception

Holmes Lounge

Hosted by the Washington University Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program

7:00 pm - 10:00 pm

Banquet - Holmes Lounge

Presidential Address: Paul Bloom (Dept. of Psychology, Yale University)

But Is It Art?

Chair: SPP President-Elect David Sanford (Dept. of Philosophy, Duke University)

Sunday, June 4th

8:30 am - 9:00 am

Coffee

Atrium

9:00 am - 11:30 am

Invited Symposium #4: *Social Cognition*

Auditorium

Chair: Dan Haybron (Dept. of Philosophy, Saint Louis University)

How (Not) to Build a Person

John Doris (Dept. of Philosophy & PNP, Washington University)

It's the Thought That Counts: Cognitive Neuroscience Studies of Theory of Mind

Rebecca Saxe (Dept. of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT)

Trait Inferences from Faces: Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms

Alexander Todorov (Dept. of Psychology, Princeton University)

11:30 pm - 1:30 pm

Business Meeting & Lunch

Holmes Lounge

Hosted by the Washington University Department of Philosophy

Poster Presentations

The theoretical entities of folk psychology

Kristin Andrews (*Dept. of Philosophy, York University*)

Bullshit and personality disorders

Sara Bernal (*Dept. of Philosophy, St Louis University*)

Transcending path-dependent learning?

Kristina Biniek (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of South Florida*)

Offloading the mind

Michael Bruno (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Arizona*)

How reliable is that monkey?

Stephen Crowley (*Dept. of Philosophy, Indiana University*)

Assessing individualism and anti-individualism

Richard Doan (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside*)

Rethinking Gareth Evans' answer to Molyneux's question

Brian Glenney (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Southern California*)

Extended cognition and the coupling-constitution fallacy

Martin Godwyn (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of British Columbia*)

Making use of meaning with help from the extended mind

Steven Paul Harris (*Dept. of Philosophy, Indiana University*)

Reasoning about contradictions across cultures: Empirical findings

Brian Huss (*Dept. of Philosophy, York University*)

Comparability, rationality, and neuroeconomics

Anthony Landreth (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati*)

Two routes to moral consideration: A psychological investigation of moral intuitions

Tania Lombrozo (*Dept. Of Psychology, Harvard University*)

Perceptual kinds

Jack Lyons (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Arkansas*)

Social emotions

Heidi Maibom (*Dept. of Philosophy, Carleton University*)

Neural Representation, Embodied and Evolved

Pete Mandik (*Dept. of Philosophy, William Paterson University*)

Virtue ethics and situationism: Where's the beef?

Kelby Mason (*Dept. of Philosophy, Rutgers University*)

Empathy and social cognition: Models and sex differencesDeborah Mower (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin--Madison*)**Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions**Thomas Nadelhoffer (*Dept. of Philosophy, Florida State University*)**What heterophenomenology misses**Alyssa Ney (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Rochester*)**The locations of sounds**Casey O'Callaghan (*Dept. of Philosophy, Bates College*)**On Systematicity**David Pereplyotchik (*Dept. of Philosophy, CUNY*)**Stomaching Prinz's gut reactions**J. Brendan Ritchie (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Manitoba*)**Collectivism and the emergence of linguistic universals**Georg Theiner (*Dept. of Philosophy, Indiana University*)**The problem of abstraction in some recent theories of concept learning**Matt Van Cleave (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati*)**Intrinsic computational models and the experience of physical properties**Jonathan Waskan (*Dept. of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*)**The function of folk psychology: Mind reading or mind shaping?**Tad Zawidzki (*Dept. of Philosophy, George Washington University*)**A cognitive-neuroscience approach to the Sorites paradox**Mark Zelcer/Leib Litman (*Dept. of Philosophy, CUNY Graduate School*)

Contributed Talk Abstracts

Michael L. Anderson

Evidence for massive redeployment of brain areas in cognitive functions

Saturday, 9:00 am – Rm. 218

This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH), an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous cognitive functions. MRH offers a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other, in such a way as to account for the supporting data on both sides of the argument. MRH is supported by some case studies of redeployment, and an empirical review of 135 imaging experiments.

John Bickle

Who Says You Can't Do a Molecular Biology of Consciousness

Thursday, 1:00 pm – Rm. 218

Virtually every philosopher and cognitive scientist studying consciousness denies that molecular neurobiology will fully explain any of its features. However, some recent discoveries suggest otherwise. Here I survey in detail experimental results suggesting that agonistic activities at distinct subunits of GABA_A receptor proteins are dissociable molecular mechanisms for conscious awareness and arousal state. These experiments use genetically engineered mice with mutations at single amino acid residues of GABA_A receptor subunits, subunit-selective and nonselective anesthetic drugs, and a variety of behavioral tests commonly used to measure these conscious states in rodents. These results fit the “intervene cellularly/molecularly and track behaviorally” account of reduction-in-practice (reviewed briefly here) that I’ve developed in recent publications. The upshot is that “ruthless” psychoneural reductionism’s assault on consciousness has already begun.

Fiery Cushman

The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgments:

Testing three principles of harm

Friday, 1:00 pm - Auditorium

Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer to this question demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. Here we investigate three principles guiding subjects’ moral judgments and then ask whether they are invoked to explain those judgments. Across a variety of moral dilemmas, subjects’ judgments about the permissibility of harming an individual aligned with three principles: (1) harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (2) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side-effect of a goal, and (3) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second principle. This finding has significance for the methods and theories of moral psychology: the moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared to those articulated in justification and, when they are, evidence emerges that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning while others are not.

Paula Droege
Now or never: How consciousness represents time
 Thursday, 1:00 pm – Rm. 218

Consciousness has a peculiar affinity for presence. What we are conscious of is present before us, occurrent, now. The importance of this temporal aspect of consciousness is often obscured by a focus on the contents of consciousness – the feelings, thoughts and sensations that fill our conscious minds. Yet it seems that most or all of these contents can be unconscious. Due to the representational similarity between unconscious and conscious contents, we may despair of explaining consciousness in representational terms. If both conscious and unconscious pains represent tissue damage, what could a representational theory offer to distinguish these two markedly different forms of experience? The temporal aspect of consciousness provides an answer. Conscious states represent their contents *as now*; conscious contents constitute a representation of the present moment.

To understand how conscious states come to represent time in this way, we need a distinction between a mental state that *represents now* and one that simply *occurs now*. I argue that temporal representation begins with the ability to track change. At this rudimentary level creatures appreciate causal relations and learn to exploit them. A teleofunctional theory of representation (Millikan 2004) accounts for this developmental process in terms of the creature's ability to successfully act within its environment in response to available resources and dangers.

The ability to track change is the first step in the development of temporal representation. The next step is to acquire the capacity to represent a situation explicitly as 'now' and compare it with past situations in order to prepare for the future. An assessment of the situation *now* requires a representation of current conditions *as current*, including current thoughts about the future and past. In other words, sensations, thoughts, memories and plans are conscious when represented *as now*.

Justin C. Fisher
Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis
 Thursday, 1:00 pm - Auditorium

I propose an empirical methodology for doing philosophical analysis and argue that this methodology has two important virtues. I call this methodology *Pragmatic Conceptual Analysis*, or PCA. PCA proposes that we think of our shared concepts as having whatever application conditions they would need to have in order best to continue delivering benefits in the ways they have regularly delivered benefits in the past. My goal will be to establish that PCA is not just a good way of figuring out what application conditions we *ought* to use for our concepts; it is also a good way of revealing the correct application conditions (or 'meanings') that our concepts already have. To reach this conclusion, I use what I call a 'bootstrapping argument'. In the first phase of this argument (section 3), I establish that PCA at least has what I call *normative authority*: we have reason to adopt the explications that PCA delivers, even if we think doing so requires stipulative revisions in the meanings of our concepts. In the second phase (sections 4 through 6), I use this normative authority to establish that PCA also has what I call *descriptive authority*: when we understand concept-meaning in the way we ought to understand it – the way licensed by the normative authority of PCA – we see that, rather than being revisionary, PCA is a semantically conservative tool that uncovers (what we should think of as being) the meanings our concepts already have.

Joshua Knobe & Erica Roedder
The Concept of Valuing: Experimental Studies
Friday, 1:00 pm - Auditorium

We report the results of two experiments designed to explore the ordinary concept of *valuing*. The results indicate that people's intuitions about whether a given attitude counts as a 'valuing' depend in part on whether the object of that attitude is itself good or bad. In other words, people's application of the concept of valuing appears to depend not only on their beliefs about the agent's psychological states but also on their beliefs about the true moral status of the objects of that agent's attitudes.

Edouard Machery
Massive Modularity and Brain Evolution
Saturday, 9:00 am – Rm. 218

Quartz (2002) argues that some recent findings about the evolution of the brain (Finlay and Darlington 1995) are inconsistent with evolutionary psychologists' massive modularity hypothesis. In substance, Quartz contends that since the volume of the neocortex evolved in a convergent manner, natural selection did not act on neocortical systems independently of each other, which is a necessary condition for the massive modularity of our cognition to be true. I argue however that Quartz' argument fails to undermine the massive modularity hypothesis.

George Newman
Psychological foundations of the Argument from Design
Friday, 1:00 pm – Rm. 218

Recently, debates over how (or, if) evolution should be taught in public schools have focused largely on whether biological complexity is best explained by intelligent design. At the heart of this debate is the notion that the order found in the natural world necessitates an intelligent and purposeful designer. Beyond a political tool, the "Argument from Design" (Paley, 1854) continues to have a great deal of intuitive appeal: approximately 80% of Americans are likely to endorse some form of creationism as the best explanation for the origin and development of human beings. The proposed paper asks, from the perspective of cognitive and developmental psychology, why is the argument from design so appealing?

We propose that there exists a highly interrelated set of beliefs that reflect a deep-seeded, cognitive bias to use agents to explain the existence of order. We propose that such a bias emerges in preverbal infants and appears relatively continuous across development, and review relevant empirical studies that support this claim. We propose that the causal connection between agents and order fits into a larger framework of agent-based explanations, whereby certain stimuli are (a) recognized as irregular, "ordered", or nonrandom, and (b) those stimuli are inferred to result from the actions of agents. Thus, given ordered stimuli for which physical-mechanical explanations are not apparent, we are biased to default to agent-based explanations.

Amy Perfors
Poverty of the Stimulus? A rational approach
Saturday, 9:00 am – Rm. 218

The Poverty of the Stimulus (PoS) argument holds that children do not receive enough evidence to infer the existence of core aspects of language, such as the dependence of linguistic rules on hierarchical phrase structure. We reevaluate the PoS argument by using a rational Bayesian model of grammar to show that an unbiased learner choosing between structure-dependent and structure-independent explanations of the input will ultimately prefer the structure-dependent one for reasons of simplicity and generalizeability. This choice enables the learner to master subtle aspects of syntax, such as the auxiliary fronting rule in interrogative formation, even without having heard directly.

Eric Schwitzgebel
Do Things Look Flat?
Thursday, 1:00 – Rm. 218

Does a penny viewed at an angle in some sense look elliptical, as though projected on a two-dimensional surface? Many philosophers have said such things, from Malebranche (1674/1997) and Hume (1739/1978), through early 20th-century sense-data theorists, to Tye (2000) and Noë (2004). I confess that it doesn't seem this way to me, though I'm somewhat baffled by the phenomenology and pessimistic about our ability to resolve the dispute. I raise geometrical complaints against the view and conjecture that views of this sort draw some of their appeal from over-analogizing visual experience to painting or photography. Theorists writing in contexts where vision is typically analogized to less-projective media – wax signet impressions in ancient Greece, stereoscopy in introspective psychology circa 1900 – are substantially less likely to attribute such projective distortions to visual appearances.

Deena Skolnick, Josh Goodstein, and Paul Bloom
The Creation of Fictional Worlds
Saturday, 9:00 am - Auditorium

How do readers interpret fictional stories? Although they undeniably begin with the text of the story, story texts are necessarily incomplete descriptions of fictional worlds. How do readers create complete worlds from impoverished information? Several philosophical theories agree that readers use the real world as a starting point, enabling them to fill in any missing details from the text. But these theories disagree on the extent to which real-world information is imported into a fictional world. The current study documents how much of the real world is present in any given fictional world by presenting subjects (N=52) with three stories and asking about the content of these story worlds. Subjects' responses indicated that they were willing to import many real world facts into fictional worlds, though what exactly is imported depends on two main variables: (1) the distance that a narrative world lies from reality and (2) the types of fact being imported. Facts that are true of the real world are more likely to be imported into worlds that are more similar to the real world, and facts that are more central to the representation of the real world are more likely to be imported. These results indicate that subjects make nuanced inferences when creating fictional worlds, basing their representations on both how different a story world is from the real world and on what they know to be causally central to the real world.

Tamler Sommers
Honor and Responsibility: Two Ways to Motivate Retribution
Thursday, 1:00 pm - Auditorium

I argue that two distinct sets of norms have emerged to reinforce the link between retributive emotions and retributive behavior: norms about honor and norms about moral responsibility. I observe that the primary difference between these two systems lies in where the normative focus is placed after an offense. In “honor cultures,” the normative focus is on the offended party; in “moral responsibility cultures” it is on the offender. Next, I argue that each system is well tailored to the particular features of the environment in which these varieties of retribution emerge. Finally, I examine the philosophical implications of these observations, in particular how they relate to the contemporary free will debate.

Dustin R. Stokes
Learning Without Looking: Incubated Cognition and Creativity
Saturday, 9:00 am - Auditorium

Many traditional theories of creativity put heavy emphasis on an incubation stage in creative cognitive processes. The basic phenomenon is a familiar one: we are working on a task or problem, we leave it aside for some period of time, and when we return attention to the task we have some new insight that services completion of the task. This feature, combined with other ostensibly mysterious features of creativity, has discouraged naturalistically minded philosophers from theorizing it. This avoidance is misguided: we can maintain unconscious incubated cognition as (sometimes) part of the creative process and we can explain it in scientifically responsible ways. This paper, focusing on the effects of attention on the functional networking of the brain, attempts just such an explanation. It also serves to assuage the naturalist’s skepticism about other features of creative cognition. The broad upshot, one would hope, is that philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists return some attention to the long neglected topic of creativity.

Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander, Jonathan Weinberg
The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp
Thursday, 1:00 pm - Auditorium

A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought experiments are considered first. Our results show that: 1) willingness to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case increases after being presented with a clear case of non-knowledge, and 2) willingness to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case decreases after being presented with a clear case of knowledge. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of intuitions. We conclude that our results strengthen the empirical case against intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs.

Charles Wallis
Neo-Reductionist Views of Know How
Friday, 1:00 pm – Rm. 218

The recent literature on know how has focused almost exclusively upon the neoreductionist theory offered by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (Stanley and Williamson 2001). Discussion surrounding the paper concerns the argument S&W offer for their view and methodological presuppositions which underlie that argument. While such discussions are useful, I wish to turn the debate to the theory itself. In this paper I argue that contrary to popular perception the thesis forwarded by S & W's paper is in fact clearly and demonstrably false. Moreover, S&W theory seems inadequate to handle standard cases from the know how literature—cases which S&W seem to acknowledge as legitimate.

Jonathan Weinberg & Aaron Meskin
The Cognitive Architecture of Imaginative Resistance
Saturday, 9:00 am - Auditorium

Although the imagination is largely unconstrained in what contents it can entertain, there is a significant class of exceptions to that generalization, including cases of obvious moral falsehood and various sorts of metaphysical impossibilities. We propose a way to apply a 'single code architecture' of the imagination to explain this phenomenon. In essence, this type of imaginative resistance occurs when we are trying to use one psychological mechanism to keep a content in the imagination, just as a different mechanism is trying to keep it out.

Rob Wilson
Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist
Friday, 1:00 pm – Rm. 218

This paper attempts to do two things. First, it recounts the problem of intentionality, as it has typically been conceptualized, and argues that it needs to be reconceptualized in light of the radical form of externalism most commonly referred to as the extended mind thesis. Second, it provides an explicit, novel argument for that thesis, what I call the argument from meaning making, and offers some defense of that argument. This second task occupies the core of the paper, and in completing it I distinguish *active cognition* from *cyborg fantasy arguments* for externalism, and develop the analogy between the extended mind thesis in the cognitive sciences and developmental systems theory in developmental biology. The rethinking of the problem of intentionality on offer leads not so much to a solution as to a dissolution of that problem, as traditionally conceived.

Liane L. Young

Moral Judgment is More Consequentialist in Individuals with Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage

Friday, 1:00 pm - Auditorium

How and to what extent does emotion inform human moral cognition? Recent evidence from psychology and neuroscience suggests that emotion plays a central role in our moral judgments. For example, functional neuroimaging experiments consistently show brain activation in areas thought to be involved in processing emotion during moral judgment tasks. Neuropsychological studies have shown deficits in moral reasoning and action associated with impairments in processing emotion. The present results indicate that emotion plays a *causal* role in some forms of moral *judgment*. Individuals with adult-onset bilateral damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), an area noted for its critical role in linking emotion to decision making, were more likely to endorse “personal”, that is, emotionally salient, moral violations presented in hypothetical scenarios than were comparison groups. Specifically, VMPC participants were more likely to endorse violations that maximized aggregate welfare (e.g. throwing one man in front of a train to save five men). In other words, VMPC participants were more likely to generate consequentialist judgments. There was no difference between VMPC participants and comparison groups on either non-moral (control) or “impersonal”, less emotionally salient, moral scenarios. The results of this study therefore suggest that the effect of VMPC damage on moral judgment is specific to its role in emotional processing. Building on existing theories in moral psychology as well as the neurobiology of emotion and decisionmaking, this study provides new insight into the neurocognitive basis of human moral judgment.

Contributed Poster Abstracts

Kristin Andrews

The theoretical entities of folk psychology

I argue that not all of the theoretical entities of folk psychology are mental states. Rather, the folk understand that behavior is sometimes caused by other entities, such as traits. Traits cannot be shorthand for beliefs and desires, since they are not identical to beliefs and desires, nor is an understanding of belief and desire necessary for an understanding of traits. These arguments are defended by evidence from developmental psychology and autism. Given these considerations, I conclude that that folk do not think that all intentional behaviors are caused by reasons.

Sara Bernal

Bullshit and Personality Disorders

Bullshit is very much in the news these days. The debate on the subject that Harry Frankfurt opened nearly 20 years ago has continued with renewed energy in a political climate where bullshit is *de rigueur* (Frankfurt 1988). In this era of heightened public bullshit, *private* bullshit should not be overlooked. For it is a perennial problem that bullshit arises in interpersonal interactions. It may also arise within a single individual: people can bullshit themselves. It seems to me that bullshit is at the core of many of the problems encountered and created by those afflicted with so-called *personality disorders*—those who have certain severe problems with navigating the social world. Accordingly, I will propose an analysis of bullshit that may be usefully applied to the psychology of personality disorders, and perhaps more widely in psychiatry. Applying this notion of bullshit to personality disorders tells us something interesting about why the traits that comprise them are considered pathological, and sheds light on them in other ways as well.

Kristina Biniek

Transcending Path-Dependent Learning?

Andy Clark holds that public language makes collective cognition possible, which in turn allows human beings to transcend the path-dependent nature of individual human cognition. This idea of transcending path is considered in light of recent work on the kinds of paths followed in childhood cognitive development and adult cognition. I argue that while public language *assists* in the categorization process, the path of cognitive development is largely dictated by apparent biological constraints. As to claims that cognition and memory can be collective, it is only the collection and (inert) storage of the products of individual cognition that in some sense are collective. Each individual must initiate the cognitive processes required to take this inert external content and make it accessible to his own consciousness if he wishes to make use of any aspect of this amassed body of information.

Michael Bruno

Offloading the Mind

In a number of recent publications, Andy Clark has defended two radical ideas about the nature of the human mind. The first is the *extended mind hypothesis* that some of the physical vehicles involved in cognition are located outside of the body of the individual. The second is the hypothesis that epistemic technology has played a fundamentally formative role in making us who we are. Let's call this the *dumb brain hypothesis*. The main task of this paper will be to explore the connections between these hypotheses, particularly in light of Kim Sterelny's recent criticism.

Stephen Crowley

How reliable is that monkey?

Naturalism is currently a popular position within epistemology. Not all naturalisms however are equally naturalistic. I focus on an 'ideal type' of naturalism (which I call Epistemology as Science, or EaS for short) that represents the empirical extreme in the continuum of naturalized epistemologies. Current work in the EaS framework standardly links EaS with a reliabilist approach to knowledge and justification. I argue that although this alliance is immune, by its own lights, to standard epistemic criticisms of reliabilism, serious challenges to its adequacy are raised by current work in comparative psychology on uncertainty monitoring in monkeys.

Richard Doan

Assessing Individualism and Anti-Individualism

Social anti-individualism asserts, while individualism denies, that the belief a person expresses with her words is partly determined by their conventional meanings. I will argue that anti-individualism and individualism are both incorrect as general theses about mental content. A non-individualistic interpretation may be appropriate in some cases, while an individualistic interpretation may be appropriate in others. I propose a general procedure for determining what belief a speaker expresses with her words. If a speaker who does not completely understand her words is told that her assertion is false, and she does not take the belief she is trying to express also to be false, then she is to be interpreted individualistically. If she does take her belief to be false, then she might be interpreted non-individualistically. Thus, the correct interpretation is determined by the speaker's grasp of the standards she takes for the assessment of her belief.

Brian Glenney

Rethinking Gareth Evans' Answer to Molyneux's Question

I review two recent developmental studies on newborn infants that give evidence in support of a 'yes' answer to Molyneux's Question—whether the newly sighted can recognize tactually familiar shapes by sight alone. I then develop Gareth Evans' 'yes' answer, based on the sameness of 'egocentric' information, to account for this evidence.

Martin Godwyn

Extended cognition and the coupling-constitution fallacy

In recent years a number of cognitive scientists and philosophers have advanced the thesis that an individual's cognitive processes or states sometimes lie (at least in part) outside of their brain or body. The purpose of this paper is to defend this view – which I shall refer to as ‘extended cognitivism’ – against a recent line of criticism from two of its most prominent critics: Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa. They argue that the extended cognitivist commits what they call the ‘coupling-constitution fallacy’. This fallacy, they suggest, ‘is the most common mistake that extended mind theorists make’ and which (they contend) involves a tacit move from the observation that process X is in some way causally connected (coupled) to a cognitive process Y to the conclusion that X is part of the cognitive process Y. After setting out some important definitions that allow us to state extended cognitivism precisely, I argue that their objection fails in at least two distinct respects. Firstly, it mischaracterises the essential argumentative basis for the extended cognitivist position and presents, thereby, a straw man. Secondly, and notwithstanding the first respect, it places too strong a demand on functional explanation generally, and, *qua* species of functional explanation, on cognitive explanation in particular.

Steven Paul Harris

Making Use of Meaning With Help From The Extended Mind

Robert Wilson defends the extended mind thesis (EM) by making the novel claim that human intentionality involves the integrated functioning of both internal and external cognitive resources. This new argument for EM, the argument “from meaning making”, is nevertheless typical in suggesting that traditional questions concerning intentionality are no longer urgent or interesting. Against this deflationary trend, I argue in this paper that the extended mind thesis does not imply the dissolution of traditional questions concerning human intentionality.

Brian Huss

Reasoning About Contradictions Across Cultures: Empirical Findings

This paper concerns research in psychology that may suggest the Law of Noncontradiction (LNC) is not universally held as a logical standard. First I argue that if the LNC is not at least very widely held across cultures, then we face the threat of logical relativism. I also try to show how empirical findings are relevant to the status of the LNC as an objective standard of reasoning. Second, I consider some studies conducted by Kaiping Peng and Richard Nisbett, and argue, contrary to their claims, that the studies fail to show that East Asian subjects are more likely to believe contradictions than Western subjects. Third, I outline my own ongoing empirical research on the issue and present some preliminary results. My aim is to overcome what I take to be some shortcomings of Peng and Nisbett's methodology if our goal is to determine whether adherence to the LNC is specific to particular cultures.

Anthony Landreth

Comparability, Rationality and Neuroeconomics

The problem of comparability is finding a quality shared by disparate goals or options that enables their comparative ranking in decisions (e.g. which goal to pursue, or which option to choose). Apples taste different from oranges, sex is generally quite different from dining, and teleological and deontological motivations often involve very distinct foreseeable outcomes. Yet, we choose among disparate options often without hesitation. Scientifically, we would like to discover a form of ranking that enables us to predict which goal is the most likely an agent will pursue in a context. The common currency hypothesis in neuroeconomics holds that the substrate of comparisons is partially localized to orbitofrontal cortex, and many regard midbrain dopamine as a key player in the ranking of disparate goals. Ranking, under the common currency hypothesis, is some form of network dynamics in circuits involving orbitofrontal cortex. Advocates of the common currency hypothesis include Edmund Rolls, Read Montague, and Gregory Berns. In this paper, I will propose a framework for sharpening the common currency hypothesis as it appears in these authors' work, describe some limitations of the current evidence, and consider the implications of the hypothesis for normative theories of rationality.

Tania Lombrozo

Two Routes to Moral Consideration: A Psychological Investigation of Moral Intuitions

What makes an entity worthy of moral consideration? The literature in moral philosophy provides no shortage of answers, yet most people adopt a moral framework without recourse to the subtleties and distinctions that characterize the philosophical enterprise. Presumably such frameworks result from psychological mechanisms that systematically distinguish entities that are deemed worthy of moral consideration, like people, from those that are not, like material goods. One strategy for uncovering the nature of such mechanisms is to examine entities about which people differ in their moral judgments, such as non-human animals and human fetuses. In particular, do individuals with different judgments about an entity's moral status conceptualize that entity differently? Experiment 1 explores this question, and finds support for the hypothesis that moral judgments are related to how an entity is conceptualized. Specifically, participants who judged non-human animals worthy of moral considerations attributed greater levels of cognitive and emotional sophistication to animals. However, this difference in conceptualization was not found in judgments about fetuses, for which religious views were the best predictor of moral judgments. The different pattern of findings for animals and fetuses suggests the existence of multiple routes to moral consideration. Experiments 1 and 2 additionally examine the relationship between explicit moral views about an entity's moral status and intuitions on one of moral philosophy's most celebrated examples: trolley car problems. The data from these experiments suggest that people who are deeply committed to the moral status of non-human animals have the same intuitions on trolley car problems when the victims are gorillas as when they are humans, while uncommitted people do not. Collectively, these findings begin to shed light on the psychological mechanisms that underlie moral intuitions and moral reasoning.

Jack Lyons

Perceptual kinds

What properties do perceptual states represent things as having or instantiating? One way to constrain answers to this question is to turn from the intensional notion of representation-*as* to the extensional notion of perceptual kinds, phenomenological similarity classes of stimuli. It is easier to tell whether a given class constitutes a perceptual kind than to tell whether a given property is part of the content of a perceptual state.

Heidi Maibom

Social Emotions

According to William James “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble” (1884, 190). However, even Jamesians are reluctant to accept this view when it comes to more social emotions. More social emotions include emotional reactions to social events (secondary emotions) as well as special kinds of emotions like guilt, shame, and jealousy. In this paper I explore the more radical idea that we believe that our partner is unfaithful because we feel jealous, we believe that we have done wrong because we are ashamed, and so on. I do not deny that emotions are sometimes—even often—preceded by cognitive evaluations. I merely defend the idea that many more social emotions do not require such prior evaluations. To do this, I build on the recent elaboration of the James-Lange theory by Jesse Prinz.

Pete Mandik

Neural Representation, Embodied and Evolved

What could representational content be such that appeal to it can be explanatory? In this paper, I tackle such questions by addressing how representations that explain intelligent behavior might be acquired through processes of Darwinian evolution. I present the results of computer simulations of evolved neural network controllers and discuss the similarity of the simulations to real world examples of neural network control of animal behavior. I argue that focusing on the simplest cases of evolved intelligent behavior, in both simulated and real organisms, reveals that evolved representations must carry information about the creature's environments and further can do so only if their neural states are appropriately isomorphic to environmental states. Further, these informational and isomorphism relations are what are tracked by content attributions in folk-psychological and cognitive scientific explanations of these intelligent behaviors.

Kelby Mason

Virtue ethics and situationism--where's the beef?

A recent argument from John Doris, Gil Harman and Mariah Merritt purports to show that mainstream virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. Virtue ethics supposedly relies on a particular conception of character traits, the globalist conception, and situationist social psychology has shown globalism to misdescribe how most people behave.

There are at least three different ways to interpret the philosophical situationist argument and neither its supporters nor opponents have been clear which of the three interpretations is in question. On the first version of the argument, the supposed problem is that most people actually lack globalist traits. On the second version, the supposed problem is that people cannot develop globalist traits. On the third version, the supposed problem is that people would do no better by trying to develop globalist traits. The third version is the best interpretation of the argument, but even it requires more empirical support than the philosophical situationists have given.

Douglas Meehan

The Modality Specificity of Visual and Tactile Shape Sensations

We sense the spatial properties of objects in different sensory modalities. We can, e.g., both see and feel an object's shape. And we sense objects' properties in virtue of having states, e.g., sensations, with mental qualities. So both visual and tactile sensations have mental qualities pertaining to shape. We must therefore determine whether the mental qualities of visual and tactile sensations pertaining to the same shapes are themselves the same.

Campbell (1996) argues that the qualitative characters of visual and tactile sensations of shapes are the same. Qualitative character, he claims, is determined by the properties we perceive; and since we see and feel the same shapes, the qualitative characters of seeing and feeling shape are the same.

Recent fMRI studies (James et al., 2006) showing visual and tactile shape perception involve common representations in the lateral occipital cortex (LOC) appear to support this view. These studies show visual and tactile shape primes cause equivalent increases in activation of LOC when subjects are subsequently presented with shapes matching those primes. James et al. argue this shows visual and tactile shape perception involve only those common, amodal representations. If so, visual and tactile sensations of shape are amodal and have common mental qualities. However, I argue, these experiments don't show visual and tactile shape perception involve only the amodal representations in LOC, so they don't show visual and tactile mental qualities pertaining to shape are the same.

I then argue that experimental data revealing asymmetries in infants' abilities to recognize shape across sensory modalities (Streri and Pêcheux, 1986; Streri, 1987) suggest the mental qualities of visual and tactile sensations pertaining to shape are different. And I argue the homomorphism theory of sensing (Rosenthal, 2005) best explains the nature of modality-specific mental qualities pertaining to shape.

Deborah Mower

Empathy and Social Cognition: Models and Sex Differences

In a recent proposal to explain cognitive sex differences, Baron-Cohen (2003, 2004) holds that we understand and predict others through empathy, or empathizing. The "Social Superiority Argument" is the claim that social cognition is empathic, and that since females have superior empathizing abilities, they have superior abilities for social cognition. Using research on affect intensity and frequency as well as emotional discrimination, I argue that this model of empathy is problematic. If empathy is characterized narrowly as a caring identification or attunement to another's internal state, then it is false that social cognition is empathy or an empathic process. If empathy is recast more broadly as affect or emotion, then it is false that females show increased empathizing abilities. Either way, the conclusion, that females have a superior ability for social cognition, cannot be drawn. The failure of the Social Superiority Argument demonstrates the need for more precise models of empathy and social cognition that are sensitive to research on sex differences.

Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz

Folk Intuitions, Slippery Slopes, and Necessary Fictions: An Essay on Saul Smilansky's Illusionism

In §1 of this paper, we provide a brief overview of Saul Smilansky's illusionism, paying particular attention to two key empirical assumptions he makes concerning folk beliefs and intuitions. In §2 we suggest that these two straightforward empirical assumptions do not appear to be supported by the gathering data about folk beliefs and intuitions, and we discuss why this is particularly problematic for Smilansky's view. After all, if it turns out either that (a) Smilansky is wrong to assume that most people have illusory beliefs about libertarian free will and ultimate responsibility, or (b) he is right that people do have these illusory beliefs, but wrong that they could not dispense with them without losing something important, then it would no longer make sense to be an illusionist about libertarian free will. It's not merely that Smilansky happens to use these assumptions in order to motivate his view; these assumptions represent the *only way* of motivating his view.

Alyssa Ney

What Heterophenomenology Misses

In this paper, I examine the adequacy of heterophenomenology, Dennett's proposal for an entirely third person method of acquiring the data for a scientific theory of consciousness. From considerations intended to be uncontroversial from the standpoint of naturalism, i.e. those not relying on antecedent qualia-philic assumptions, this paper argues that heterophenomenology is not able to capture some of the fine grained explananda that ought to be targeted by a scientific theory of consciousness.

Casey O'Callaghan

The Locations of Sounds

When you hear the sound of a car driving by on the street outside your window, you learn not just whether the car has a hole in its muffler or has squealing brakes. You also learn something about the location of the car because hearing furnishes information about the locations of its objects. By listening, you learn not only about the character of the things and happenings around you, but also about where they are in the surrounding environment. However, a number of philosophers, most notably Strawson (1959) and O'Shaughnessy (2000), have challenged the spatial character of audition. In this paper, I argue that auditory perception indeed furnishes genuine locational awareness of ordinary objects and events. Furthermore, I argue that what grounds our ability to hear and learn the locations of sound-producing sources is that frequently we do hear the locations of sounds themselves. This feature of auditory experience has consequences for understanding the objects of auditory perception. If we veridically hear the locations of sounds, then the most prominent conception of sounds fails as an account of what we hear.

David Pereplyotchik

On Systematicity

An essential aspect of Jerry Fodor's view of cognition is a commitment to the claim that the representational medium of cognition is compositional. Known as the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis, Fodor's claim is that mental processes are couched in a language-like system of representation. In this paper, I attempt to show that a leading argument for the LOT hypothesis is not entirely satisfactory, on two separate counts. Firstly, it glosses over the distinction between language qua formal object and language qua occurrent mental process. In so doing, the argument invites the charge of circularity. Secondly, the argument relies on a premise to the effect that systematicity is a contingent property of natural languages. I argue that this premise is false, provided that systematicity is defined in terms of the notions of grammaticality and natural linguistic kind.

J. Brendan Ritchie

Stomaching Prinz's Gut Reactions

In *Gut Reactions* (2004) Jesse Prinz makes two important novel claims concerning emotions: (1) that somatic and cognitive theories of emotion, which have been thought at odds, can be reconciled; And (2) that, contra Paul Griffiths (1997), emotion is a natural kind. In both cases Prinz relies on Fred Dretske's (1981, 1986) theory of representation. It is for this reason that Prinz fails to establish (1) and (2). Regarding (1), the theory of emotion Prinz defends misapplies Dretske's theory. Regarding (2), by relying on Dretske's notions of calibration, too many states, which are intuitively not emotions, must be considered such.

Georg Theiner

Collectivism and the Emergence of Linguistic Universals

In *The Common Mind*, Pettit (1993) investigates a thesis he calls *collectivist outflanking*. It amounts to the view that our psychology is systematically rigged in favor of certain aggregate-social regularities, because there is a filter preventing all individuals whose psychology does not underpin these regularities from surviving. Pettit argues that the only filter strong enough to enforce such a process is *group-level natural selection*, and the special conditions required make its occurrence rather unlikely. My goal is to revisit Pettit's thesis in the domain of language, and challenge his arguments with results derived from Artificial Life-inspired models in computational evolutionary linguistics. First, I illustrate a biological route towards outflanking, based on an interaction between learning and *individual-level natural selection* known as the "Baldwin Effect". Then I present an alternative route which is based on an interaction between learning and *cultural evolution*. I conclude that Pettit's skepticism about the occurrence of collectivist outflanking is unwarranted.

Matt Van Cleave*The Problem of Abstraction in Some Recent Theories of Concept Learning*

Jean Mandler (2004) argues that right from the beginning infants have the ability to form concepts and that these concepts are global (e.g., animal) rather than basic level (e.g., dog). Mandler's main line of support for prelinguistic conceptual thought is the categorizing behaviors of prelinguistic infants. In particular, she thinks that some categorization behaviors of infants are based on kinds which cannot be derived from mere perceptual similarity. The main problem with her theory of conceptual development, I will argue, is that it runs afoul of the problem of abstraction. Here I will argue that Barsalou's (1999, 2005) account of perceptual symbols, although it itself does not avoid the problem of abstraction, can be adapted in such a way so as to account for the categorization behavior of infants without having to invoke prelinguistic concepts, thus avoiding the problem of abstraction.

Jonathan Waskan*Intrinsic Computational Models and the Experience of Physical Properties*

I have recently shown that certain computers harbor and manipulate what I call *intrinsic computational models* (InCoMs), which are non-sentential representations of objects that are like scale models in several important respects. The existence of InCoMs provides proponents of the computational theory of mind (CTM) with a much-needed strategy for coping with the fact that the world does not appear to us in the guise of sentences and inference rules. When confronted with this fact about phenomenology, some proponents of the CTM have resorted to claiming that the character of our perceptual experience of an object is determined *entirely* by the object itself and not at all by our representation of it. The existence of InCoMs enables proponents of the CTM to instead maintain that it is our perceptual representations that determine the character of our experiences of objects.

Tad Zawidzki*The Function of Folk Psychology: Mind Reading or Mind Shaping?*

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. *mind reading*, is the sustaining function of mental state ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of mental state ascription. I argue that it serves a mind shaping function. Roughly, mental state ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with.

Mark Zelcer*A cognitive-Neuroscience approach to the Sorites paradox*

A typical logico-semantic approach taken to resolve the sorites paradox is to show, in one way or another, that it is not a paradox at all. However, if one can show that the sorites paradox is not really a paradox then they are still left with the task of showing why it appears to be a paradox. We therefore will approach the sorites from the opposite direction. We start by addressing the appearance of paradox. Then we explore what this can mean for an analysis of the paradox itself. We look at the paradox from the perspective of the various brain systems that produce the premises of the sorites argument. We suggest that the implicit and explicit cognitive systems are responsible separately for the initial plausibility of the two premises. The appearance of paradox is a function of our brain's architecture and arises from the conflicting interactions of the implicit and the explicit systems.

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