Gergely Ujhelyi [gergej ujheji]
University of Houston
PhD in Economics, Harvard University, 2007
223C McElhinney Hall
University of Houston, TX 77204
T.: (713) 743 3815
E.: gujhelyi “at” uh.edu
Research and teaching fields: Public economics, Political economy, Applied theory, Development economics
G. Ujhelyi (2013): “Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, forthcoming. [final manuscript]
In US state governments, the introduction of civil service protections caused politicians to shift public spending away from the reformed bureaucracies and towards lower level governments. The reallocation of expenditures led to reduced long-term investment by state governments.
C. Juhn, G. Ujhelyi, and C. Villegas-Sanchez (2014): “Men, Women, and Machines: How Trade Impacts Gender Inequality,” Journal of Development Economics 106, 179–193. [final manuscript]
Trade liberalization improves the labor market outcomes of women relative to men among blue-collar workers. This works by inducing exporting firms to use technology where these workers have a comparative advantage. Data from Mexico is consistent with our model.
C. Juhn, G. Ujhelyi, and C. Villegas-Sanchez (2013): “Trade Liberalization and Gender Inequality,” AER Papers & Proceedings, 103(3), 269–273. [pdf]
E.L. Glaeser and G. Ujhelyi (2010): “Regulating Misinformation,” Journal of Public Economics 94(3-4), 247-257. [final manuscript]
The case for limiting misleading advertising is less clear-cut in oligopolistic markets, where misinformation can offset underproduction. Combining taxes with other policies such as government advertising may be beneficial when firms undertake quality improving investments that are complementary to misinformation.
G. Ujhelyi (2009): “Campaign Finance Regulation with Competing Interest Groups,” Journal of Public Economics 93(3-4), 373-391. [final manuscript]
Campaign finance limits may be undesirable even if campaign contributions distort policies. Limits affect the entry of interest groups and can lead to different distortions, and even more lobbying. I show this in a common agency model with budget constrained lobbies and endogenous entry.
P. Fredriksson, E. Neumayer, and G. Ujhelyi (2007): “Kyoto Protocol Cooperation: Does Government Corruption Facilitate Environmental Lobbying?” Public Choice 133(1-2), 231-251. [final manuscript]
The answer seems to be ‘yes.’ Environmental lobbies appear to be more successful in getting the Kyoto Protocol ratified in countries that have a higher corruption index. What do corruption indices measure? See one of our working papers below.
Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of Public Economics
Society may have to choose between having better politicians or having better bureaucrats – having both may not be possible. This paper provides the first welfare evaluation of civil service reform. It discusses improved bureaucrat selection, protection from politics, tenure, and other civil service rules. I do this in a political agency model with voters, politicians, and bureaucrats.
Political Screening: Theory and Evidence from the Argentine Public Sector, with Ernesto Calvo
Politicians can ensure that public sector positions are occupied by their supporters by varying the amount of required political services and associated compensation in otherwise similar positions. The predictions of our model are borne out in the Argentine public sector, showing that political conditions at the time of hiring have long-lasting effects on wages.
What Do Corruption Indices Measure? with Dilyan Donchev
Corruption experience is a weak predictor of reported corruption perceptions, and some of the factors commonly found to “reduce” corruption, such as economic development, democratic institutions or Protestant traditions, are associated with a lower corruption perception index holding experience constant.
with Per Fredriksson
with Péter Kondor
From Rationed to Rational: Improving Households’ Water Usage Through Education in South Africa
with Andrea Szabó